Claims of Legal Authorities and ‘Expressions of Intention’: The Limits of Philosophy of Language

Abstract

This chapter shows the importance of authorities' claims in shaping and creating the law according to the ‘guise of the good’ model. It also shows that an investigation into the philosophy of language such as speech act theories presents only a partial portrait of the intricate relationship between ‘expressions of intentions’ and ‘intentional actions’. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the thesis on the nature of ‘claims of correctness and legitimate authority’ as discussed in recent literature. Section 3 gives the most plausible reconstruction of these claims in terms of speech acts, and shows the limits of this reconstruction. It demonstrates that the account provided by speech acts is dependent on a ‘unitary account’ of expressions of intention; intentional action; and intention in action. Finally, Sections 4 and 5 argue that the claims of legal authorities should be understood as expressions of intentions that involve practical knowledge.