Civilian Protection Payment and the Escalation of Violence against Civilians in Northwestern Nigeria

Abstract

AbstractHow do civilian protection payments to militias affect the dynamics of communal conflict? Building on the literature on communal conflict, civilian agency, rebel taxation, and criminal extortion, I argue that civilian protection payment is not a sustainable self-protection strategy. Civilian protection payment refers to an arrangement whereby communities pay levies to militias for protection against attacks, often buying temporary safety. Drawing on fieldwork in Nigeria’s conflict-ridden northwest region, I inductively build a theory that identifies two pathways that explain how protection payments transform into extortion and contribute to the escalation of militia violence: acquiescence or resistance. The acquiescence pathway shows how militias increase predation by demanding ever higher payments. The resistance pathway theorizes militias’ violent retaliation to punish communities that refuse to pay, instilling fear in communities that may be considering resisting and justifying their protection role for those communities that pay. The article improves our understanding of the unintended negative consequences of civilian self-protection and changing dynamics of conflict in northwestern Nigeria.