Civil war violence and competing legitimacy claims: Evidence from district level courts cases in Nepal

Abstract

Internal armed conflict is the ultimate instantiation of two actors – the state and a non-state group – challenging the legitimacy of one another. The state primarily responds violently to those who challenge, either violently or non-violently, its legitimacy. To what extent does the violent suppression of rebel activity erode state legitimacy? How does the potential for the use of violence by non-state armed groups and the offer of parallel governance erode state legitimacy? This research develops an argument specific to contested territories where both sides cannot offer model governance but use violence for opposing reasons, namely the rebel group to delegitimize the state and the state to regain its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Because the use of violence from either side creates a demand for judicial remedies, I conceptualize the degree of legitimacy in terms of the utilization of the state court system in the face of increased violence by the state or non-state armed groups. In line with theoretical expectations, empirical analyses of criminal and civil cases filed in Nepal's district courts during the Maoist insurgency suggest a statistically significant negative impact of the rebel use of violence and their offer of alternative governance on state legitimacy. Similarly, the state's use of violence had a negative and significantly detrimental effect on state legitimacy.