Civil Society and Regional Security: Tensions and Potentials in Post‑Crisis Southeast Asia

Abstract

This article delineates the areas where there might be same consonance between the dynamics underlying the present interest in Southeast Asia in the nation of civil society and those linked to the current reassessment of the discourse and practice of security in the region. The areas where tensions can be expected between these two sets of dynamics are also considered. An attempt is then made to establish the policy parameters which, under such circumstances, should guide the regional debate on these issues. The central argument advanced in this context is that it is now possible to create in Southeast Asia mechanisms allowing for a degree of synergy between the development of civil society and that of regional security which will be beneficial to both of these processes. Introduction Civil society has traditionally been conceived of by its proponents as a site of resistance against two forces: that of the state and that of the market. [1] In societies where the state apparatus and the nature of economic development are seen as creating forces of social inequality and exclusion, the exponents of civil society have argued that it can help constitute a space where critiques of these forces can be formulated and alternative trajectories of political and economic development propounded. This explains the wide appeal of the concept in current debates on the different scenarios for the reconstruction and development of Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis. If the current period is to mark a reassessment of the prevalent models of economic and political development in the region, the argument goes, then civil society represents an ideal standpoint from which to ensure that the reconstruction of regional and domestic politico-economic frameworks gives pride of place to more participatory and egalitarian processes and institutions. The rising demand for more participatory and egalitarian models of governance is also very much at the heart of the ongoing reconceptualization of domestic and regional security, as required by the recent upheavals in the region. [2] Security in Southeast Asia has been framed conventionally and quite exclusively in terms of the strength and sustainability of state-building and economic development, which have been at the top of the agenda of the countries in the region. The multi-level crisis which unfolded in mid-1997, however, appears to have ushered in a broader understanding of the different underlying factors which come into play in these processes and must, therefore, be considered part of the security equation. The importance, for example, of widening the space for public participation in development planning and implementation is now better recognized as one of these factors, which the crisis revealed as a necessary precondition to further economic and political growth. There are also dissimilarities, however, between the inner logic pursued by the proponents of civil society and that animating current debates on the reformulation of security in Southeast Asia. For its supporters, civil society is both a process and a goal: it is through the development of civil society that political and economic frameworks in the region can be made more democratic, and it is the presence of a strong and effervescent civil society which will, in the end, be proof of the success of that enterprise. The process of security reformulation, however, has, first of all, involved a much more disparate set of actors. Concepts of security are, of course, being debated within official channels, and these channels also bring into play a series of more informal networks which involve, for instance, academics, linked tacitly or more overtly to official circles. In turn, this structure, whereby Track One (official) and Track Two (unofficial) actors interact on issues of security, offers points of contact with civil society actors (dubbed Track Three in this milieu). …