Civil society and extractive capacity in authoritarian regimes: empirical evidence from Vietnam

Abstract

ABSTRACT The relationship between taxation and representation has been widely discussed in democratic contexts, but largely overlooked in authoritarian regimes. Our article aims to fill this gap by analysing the impacts of civil society, which is proxied by non-profit institutions (NPIs), on the state’s extractive capacity in Vietnam. We hypothesize that a rising civil society can constrain autocrats from extracting more revenue via two main channels: by mobilizing the citizens to supervise the rulers and protect vulnerable groups (mobilizing role), as well as by providing public services and thus helping reduce government expenditure (complementary role). Using the case study of Vietnam, our empirical tests employing fixed effects and two-stage least squares confirm a negative relationship between the growth in NPIs’ asset and the state budget revenue and expenditure in the country from 2008 to 2014. Our article contributes to the current literature in two aspects. First, it explores the non-revolutionary impacts of civil society on the autocratic ruler’s extractive capacity. Second, by the operationalization of NPIs, it provides an alternative approach to empirically evaluate the impacts of civil society in non-democratic countries where lack of reliable data remains an inherent issue.