Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites' Connection in Israel

Abstract

This article's thesis is that the close connection between the military elite and the government/political elite in Israel detracts from the quality of Israeli democracy by lending the government an unfair electoral advantage over the opposition. The article documents the various facets of the connection between the elites, which includes military commanders' publicly expressed support for government policy over that of the opposition, military elite participation in the formation of government policy, political appointments within the army, the movement from the military elite into the political (especially the government/political) elite, and informal social contacts between the two elites. It then analyzes how the connection between the two elites enhances the electoral chances of the government over those of the opposition. It shows that some facets do so directly by forming a legitimating device for the government, while others do so indirectly by being part of an exchange system that includes the other aspects of the connection. The inequitable electoral advantage thus gained by the government through its connection with the military elite contravenes the spirit-if not the letter-of democratic principles.