Abstract
NATO's unified command structure affords the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff influence in transatlantic foreign and security policy unparalleled with any other region. This, as Stephen Saideman has argued, is a function of the central role the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) plays in Alliance decision‐making. This paper explores the early development of this decision‐making structure. It is argued that the structures, norms, and rules that advantage US military advice in transatlantic security and foreign policy were a function of domestic US civil‐military and international bargaining in the early development of NATO institutions. In exchange for supporting new US commitments in Europe, uniformed Pentagon leadership insisted on German rearmament and a key set of provisions in the development of NATO military structures and institutions that ensured US military leadership, especially regards the duties and responsibilities of SACEUR.
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