Civil Association and the Idea of Contingency

Abstract

EVEN THOUGH MICHAEL OAKESHOTT is generally acknowledged as one of the most important conservative political philosophers of the twentieth century, his major work of political theory, On Human Conduct (HC), has been poorly received. The book's central idea of 'civil association' -a 'purposeless' form of association described as the only kind of polity to necessarily respect individual freedom has puzzled many readers and infuriated others. The seemingly ridiculous notion of a purposeless association has prevented many readers from appreciating Oakeshott's insights into the conceptual connection between civil association and a particular kind of freedom. This connection, it turns out, is based on the idea of contingency. And the idea of contingency, I will argue, is the key to understanding this decidedly idiosyncratic yet valuable contribution to the theme of antifoundationalism in politics. Oakeshott is well-known for arguing that Hobbes's Leviathan is unified by a single 'passionate thought. I will argue that HC is similarly unified by the hidden thought of contingency. According to Oakeshott, civil association does not impose any collective purposes on its members but only establishes general rules to be observed by individuals in choosing purposes of their own. Nor does civil association require individuals to approve of those rules but only to recognize their authority. In response, critics have argued that if civil association consists in a system of laws, it must have purposes that limit freedom. Moreover, even if we distinguish between approval of a legal system and recognition of its authority, there must still be