Abstract
In spite of Mali’s international recognition as a beacon of good governance in the region, decades of free and fair elections and extensive civil liberties failed to engender public support for democracy following the March 2012 coup d’etat. Demonstrations against the military junta were half as large as demonstrations in support of it. What looked to be strong democratic institutions from the outside were often hollow shells that privileged the elite class and marginalized everyone else – not a system ultimately worth fighting for. This essay discusses some of the constraints to democratic accountability in Mali and what can be done to mitigate them.
Highlights
In spite of Mali’s international recognition as a beacon of good governance in the region, decades of free and fair elections and extensive civil liberties failed to engender public support for democracy following the March 2012 coup d’état
* Stanford University, Political Science, California jgott@stanford.edu. For it to engender a modicum of accountability to a majority of its citizenry, requires a minimum level of civic engagement on the part of that population
When it comes to voters expressing a preference for democracy over other forms of government such as military or single-party rule, Mali ranks in the 72nd percentile of African countries
Summary
In spite of Mali’s international recognition as a beacon of good governance in the region, decades of free and fair elections and extensive civil liberties failed to engender public support for democracy following the March 2012 coup d’état. To better understand the roots of Mali’s low levels of accountability and lack of public support for democracy, my research attempts to identify and measure constraints to the democratic process. I discuss three key findings: severe information asymmetries between voters and politicians reduce voter control over elected leaders, the persistence of inegalitarian social norms undermines civic participation, and institutional arrangements dampen political competition and facilitate illicit collusion.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Stability: International Journal of Security & Development
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
