City‐chief turnover and place‐based policy change: Evidence from China

Abstract

AbstractThe linkage between political turnover and policy change has attracted considerable attention, but little empirical evidence and its impacts on regional development have been provided directly. In this study, we develop a set of indicators to directly quantify the within‐city place‐based policy changes in China between 2007 and 2017, based on the spatial distribution of city governments' industrial land supply. The results show city‐chief turnovers lead to significant changes in place‐based policies. A successor city chief typically gives up some previous place‐based policies immediately after taking office and implements new policies about 1 year later. In particular, successor chiefs with stronger promotion incentives make larger policy changes, to win more points in the competition with their predecessors. We also provide evidence that the place‐based policy discontinuity caused by political turnovers generates negative economic‐development impacts.