Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812

Abstract

Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812. By C. Edward Skeen. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999. Pp. 229. Illustrations, maps. $27.50.) Scholarly attention on the War of 1812 focusing upon the involvement of the state militias has, by concentrating on the humiliating military reverses suffered by the American forces, tended to accentuate the intrinsic weaknesses of the militia. The poor performance of the militia has come to be regarded as a symptom of the unpreparedness and ineptitude that beset James Madison's wartime administration. Recent studies have left this perception unchallenged and have continued to censure the militia's performance. This has served to undervalue its contribution, which as C. Edward Skeen observes significant, for a large majority of the military force at the disposal of the United States throughout the composed of militiamen. Skeen has redressed this omission by producing an objective examination of the role played by all American militia forces in the War of 1812. To this end he provides a carefully structured analysis of the political background of militia legislation and the failure of that legislation to provide a force capable of carrying out the role that the federal government required of it. Skeen contends that many of the problems associated with the militia were the direct result of failures at both the federal and state level to face up to the realities of their dependence on the militia, as opposed to the regular army. Despite ample and repeated demonstrations of the militia's deficiencies, such as General Arthur St. Clair's defeat in 1791, Congress remained unmoved and unwilling to reform effectively the militia or to provide anything but a handful of regular regiments. Ideological dogma, exemplified in an attachment to the militia's hypothetical ability and to the potential threat inherent in standing armies, coupled with the constitutional rights of states that guaranteed limited federal control over their militias, served to preclude congressional action. Moreover, Congress was too divided and too indecisive to provide the manpower to prosecute the war (38), the long-standing hostility between opposing political factions bedevilling all attempts to create a cohesive force. The centerpiece of militia legislation, the Uniform Militia Act of 1792, thus fundamentally flawed from its inception. Several critical aspects of militia organization, essential to the creation of an effective force that could be called upon by the federal government, were left to the discretion of the individual states. The funding of equipment and training not to be supported by federal funds, and each state allowed to determine who could be exempted from militia service. The states were permitted to form divisions, brigades, and companies as they saw fit. Ultimately state legislatures, in their differing implementation of the Uniform Militia Act, produced militias with a conspicuous lack of uniformity. This a major factor limiting the federal government's use of the militia. Fatally handicapped by deficiencies of all kinds generated by ineffectual legislation, the militia's performance in the subsequent campaigns often woeful. …