Circuits of power and accountability during institutionalisation of competitive tendering in public sector organisations

Abstract

Purpose – This study aims to analyse the role of circuits of power in institutionalising competitive tendering in public sector organisations and effects on accountability among public decision makers. Design/methodology/approach – The study used intensive field research data based on interviews, meeting observations and document analysis in a city, referred to as Sunset City, in Finland from 2008 to 2013. Findings – The relationship between institutionalisation of competitive tendering and accountability for total costs of public services depends on how public officials use management accounting and control systems to limit procurement risks and how political decision makers hold public officials to account. This study uses the concept of organisational outflanking within the circuits of power to analyse and explain the finding of ceremonial accountability. Research limitations/implications – Empirical findings cannot be generalised to other situations, but the theoretical framework used in this study can be applied elsewhere. Practical implications – It is advisable to avoid institutionalising macro-institutional market-based mechanisms, such as open competitive tendering in public health care organisations and municipalities in the EU, the consequences of which in terms of total costs, quality of services and accountability among organisational actors at local levels cannot be foreseen, minimised or controlled. Originality/value – This study uses the framework of circuits of power to extend the Burns and Scapens institutional framework to accountability for using public funds in outsourcing services during the ongoing financial crisis.