Cinema and the embodied mind: metaphor and simulation in understanding meaning in films

Maarten Coëgnarts

doi:10.1057/palcomms.2017.67

Abstract

Only recently, the broad research program of embodied cognition has fuelled a substantial and ongoing body of research at the crossroads of cognitive science and film studies. Two influential theories of embodiment that have received considerable attention among film scholars are: Conceptual Metaphor Theory (originated in the field of cognitive linguistics) and Embodied Simulation Theory (originated in the field of neuroscience). Despite their intimate relationship, both theories have been rarely addressed together in the context of film studies. This article takes on the challenge of combining both perspectives into a unified embodied model for understanding conceptual meaning in cinema. The study is driven by two key assumptions, namely: (1) that meaning in film is metaphorically mapped within our sensory-motor system and (2) that embodied simulation processes in the brain allow for the viewer to infer this meaning from the evidence provided by the film. To clarify both assumptions, the article will present a discussion of the theme of embodiment at three levels of analysis: the conceptual level (how is meaning embodied in the human mind?), the formal level (how is this meaning structured in the visual mode of expression?) and the receptive level (how is the viewer able to infer this meaning on the basis of the evidence provided by the form?). The grounding problem of fictional subjectivity in cinema (that is, how are viewers able to attribute mental states to fictional characters in films?) will be used to test the validity of both claims.

Highlights

Over the past three decades, various strands of cognitive science have embraced the thesis of “embodiment”
Both theories were attracted for the purpose of addressing two key questions, first, “How do films convey conceptual meaning to the viewer?” and second, “How is the viewer able to infer this meaning from the evidence provided by the film?”
Are audiences able to resonate with these structures, given that they are not performing those activities themselves during the act of viewing the film? It is in addressing this second paradox that EST was brought into play

Summary

Introduction

Over the past three decades, various strands of cognitive science (linguistics, psychology, philosophy, neuroscience, anthropology) have embraced the thesis of “embodiment”. Modes of expressions (for example, language, cinema) are meaningful insofar they provide evidence of this underlying embodied thought (1) (for example, insofar films offer manifestations of conceptual metaphors).

Results

Conclusion