Cicero's Paradoxes and His Idea of Utility

Abstract

_ WO SALIENT PARADOXES in Cicero's writings pose significant obstacles to appreciating him as a moral and political philosopher. The primary paradox is the tension between Cicero the self-proclaimed Socratic, student of the texts of Plato and Aristotle, the ambassador and evangelist of philosophy in Rome on the one hand and, on the other, Cicero the pragmatic statesman and orator who seems to favor action over inquiry, success over truth. A secondary and second paradox is found in Cicero's dual allegiance to the philosophical schools of academic skepticism and stoicism, the school of doubt and uncertainty on the one hand, and, on the other, the school of rigorous moral absolutes and sweeping certainties about the nature of all things. These paradoxes provide a sufficient basis for understanding the strong tendency through the ages to question Cicero's integrity and importance as a philosopher, to regard him as opportunistically eclectic or, at best, as hopelessly muddled. This article argues that both paradoxes dissipate and that a coherence and consistency is found in Cicero's teaching when the foundation of his philosophy is in view. That foundation reveals the Socratic character of Cicero's approach to philosophy and his idea of utility as the principle of coherence and consistency. That idea of utility is shown to be more in the tradition of Aristotle than in that of modern utilitarianism.