Churches and States: The Politics of Accommodation

Abstract

Th e uniquely American debate over the of church and is ongoing. This phrase, although never specified in the original Constitution nor in its amendments, has, nonetheless, been a widely accepted bedrock principle to guide the development of the relation ship between government and various religiously affiliated institutions and practices on the federal and state levels. The actual definition of church-state separation has received a variety of interpretations by the United States Supreme Court, the final interpreter of the language of the constitution. Because of the principle of stare decisis, this has led to some ambiguity in the lower federal courts as well as in a number of state courts. In some cases, the courts have leaned toward a rigid re striction of any relationship between churches and states, a strict sepa ration. In other cases, the courts have allowed a measure of interaction, a spirit of accommodationism in order to allow the innate tensions between the two religion clauses of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment to operate in a more comfortable tandem. The United States has moved from a relatively homogeneous Prot estantism at the end of the eighteenth century, through an increasingly diverse Christian landscape, to a contemporary kaleidoscope of Chris tian, Jewish, Islamic, and various other faiths. Balancing First Amend ment strictures that Congress shall make no law regarding the establishment of religion nor restricting its free has, in the second half of the twentieth century, led to extended and frequently acrimonious debate over the intent of the framers. Religiously affili ated groups, other groups that fear the intrusion of religion into public life, and individuals demanding governmental protection of their free religious exercise compete and clash in the domains of public poli cymaking, particularly in the judicial process.1