Christlicher Glaube vor dem Forum kritischer Vernunft. Kritischer Rationalismus und Theologie als Wissenschaft

Abstract

(I) According to the essence of the Christian faith, Christian theology decides against conventionalist strategy and in favor of the principle of critical examination. Immunization against criticism or protection against the failure of one's own conviction at any cost are inappropriate for a conviction that testifies of the Living God as LORD of the entire reality and seeks to show its advantage. Talk of this God can only be relevant when it intervenes, exposes itself, and portrays itself as objectively as possible. (II) Christian theology can receive decisive impetus from the scientific theory of Critical Rationalism. Criticism of classical fundamentalist« epistemology by pointing out that all attempts of substantiation create a paradoxical situation (aporia) (Friesian or Munchhausen Trilemma«) leads the scientific theory and beyond that epistemology to an up to now not recognized self-moderation, even humility, in regard to the possibility of epistemological self-justification and the range as well as the essence of (one's) own claim to truth. (III) This new modesty of the philosophical interlocutor is on one hand an enormous opportunity for Christian theology, but also brings fundamental challenges. (1) Does Christian faith not live on the certainty of its convictions? How can this then be attained when all attempts to gain certainty of truth create a paradoxical situation (aporia)? (2) How does the principle of critical examination behave in regard to the authoritative claim of revelation? (3) Is the reality of which Christian faith speaks falsifiable? (IV) In conversation with Critical Rationalism, Christian theology can point out that the philosophical interlocutor who strives for critical rationality must necessarily also presume metaphysical-theological theory elements, which first gain their plausibility in the context of (Christian) theology. Included [in these elements] are (1) the assumption of just one truth, which in the context of the postmodern p