Abstract
Abstract In this paper, I discuss Christian Wolff’s conception of motivating and normative reasons. My aim is to show that in the discussion of error cases, Wolff pursues a strategy that is strikingly similar to the strategy of contemporary defenders of nicht-psychologist accounts of motivating reasons. According to many nicht-psychologist views, motivating reasons are facts. My aim is to show that Wolff’s motivation in pursuing this strategy is very different. The point is that due to his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Wolff has to show that error cases are compatible with the PSR. The issue is worth discussing because it is not yet sufficiently explored what motivating reasons are, according to Wolff, and how they relate, in substance, to normative reasons. Methodologically, my approach can be characterized as one of “mutual illumination”: I think it is possible to highlight some crucial ambiguities of Wolff’s conception against the backdrop of the contemporary conception of motivating reasons, but also to question the importance and role of the ontological question of what motivating reasons are in contemporary discussions against the backdrop of Wolff’s position.
Highlights
In this paper, I discuss Christian Wolff’s conception of motivating and normative reasons
My aim is to show that in the discussion of error cases, Wolff pursues a strategy that is strikingly similar to the strategy of contemporary defenders of nicht-psychologist accounts of motivating reasons
The point is that due to his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Wolff has to show that error cases are compatible with the PSR
Summary
Wie können wir motiviert werden, so zu handeln, wie wir handeln sollen? Nach Christian Wolff (1679–1754) ist es bekanntlich eine Frage der Einsicht in das Gute, denn wir sollen das tun, was gut ist. Wollen wir nun nicht gefährliche Leute in der Welt werden, die Unglück über das menschliche Geschlechte durch den Vorsatz Gutes zu thun bringen; so müssen wir das Gute von dem Bösen richtig unterscheiden können, und demnach von beyden einen richtigen Begriff haben.“ Wolff, Deutsche Ethik, Vorrede 1, 3 f. Hat, dass Handlungen im Allgemeinen nicht durch mentale Zustände gerechtfertigt werden können, bestimmt er normative Gründe der Sache nach als die tatsächlichen Folgen von Handlungen.[9] Normativ ist ein Grund, aus dem man etwas tun oder unterlassen soll.[10] Wenn wir eine vollkommene Einsicht in die tatsächliche Güte von Handlungen hätten, wären die normativen Gründe auch unsere motivierenden Gründe, so die Interpretationshypothese. In Abschnitt 5 diskutiere ich dann die Irrtumsfälle vor diesem Hintergrund
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
