Christian Ethics and Applied Ethics

Abstract

I thought it useful, in responding to the paper written by J.A. Selling, to look at the relation between fundamental and applied ethics and between faith, ethics and science. Not so much because I do not share his opinion — I agree with the content of his paper — nor to limit the reflection to the general ethical foundation, but because the meaning and range of the term ‘Christian ethics’, as it relates to applied ethics, is anything but evident. This is particularly true for ethical judgments within those social sectors (such as law, medicine or economics) where religion no longer plays a commonly accepted role as a public source of legitimation. Does not the communis opinio hold that religious traditions have nothing to contribute to ethics, and certainly to applied ethics, that cannot be known and confirmed from human reason? Therefore, within a pluralistic society, reference to religious arguments in ethical reflection seems more hindersome than helpful when we seek a pragmatic consensus on rational, nonconfessional grounds, and strive towards a common value judgment on matters where religions are not competent. I believe that there are many positive arguments to support this communis opinio. I expect they will be used in our further discussion. When I continue to plead for a countercultural link between the Christian worldview and applied ethics, I do so to clarify the meaning of our position as a Centre. I believe that we must avoid understanding our position only as a sociological or political arrangement. We would do better to wonder whether there is any inherent link between Christianity and applied ethics, and if so, where this link lies. If there is no link, our function is reduced to a sociopolitical arrangement, which I personally would find regrettable. In his paper, Prof. Selling has developed a carefully constructed argumentation mentioning the following elements: different basic metaphors can function as ‘bearer’ of the ultimate criterion of ethical judgment, among them the metaphor of natural law and that of the human person; specific, role-determined concerns in ethical judgment presuppose a comprehensive criterion to be truly ethical (e.g. the ‘whole’ person); this comprehensive criterion is not an empirical given, but is grounded in its objectivity in faith in an ultimate reality; this reality is not private, but intersubjectively communicable and interpretable via its symbolistic and ritual expressions; a religious tradition, here theism, more specifically the Judeo-Christian tradition, is one form of such symbolic and ritual expression of an ultimate reality; the relation between religion and ethics is not direct or univocal, but is still real. Ethical questions play a central role in faith, and faith fulfills a critical and selective function when faced with the multiplicity of possible ethical rules. If I may continue this line of thought, looking at our job description as Centre for Christian Ethics, then I propose to understand the term ‘Christian ethics’ as follows: A Christian ethic is a more or less coherent whole of normative codes of behaviour based on a current understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition, and in particular on the rational, interpersonal reality that it expresses symbolically in its ultimacy (here, the relationship to God, revelation). This description presupposes the following: