Abstract
Nowadays cryptographic circuits are subject to attacks that no longer focus on the algorithm but on its physical implementation. Attacks exploiting information leaked by the hardware implementation are called side-channel attacks (SCA). In particular, the popular correlation power analysis (CPA) is known by its effectiveness. This paper presents a new method for an original optimisation of the CPA to recover secret keys with less power consumption traces than what is expected from the standard CPA. This improvement is done by choosing appropriate plaintexts, both non-adaptively and adaptively. A mathematical proof of the proposed procedure is provided for any cryptographic device with any known leakage model. The proposed technique is tested on the advanced encryption system (AES) S-box input (resp. output) implemented in an ATMega 163 smartcard, with hamming weight leakage model.
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