Abstract
According to a number of distinguished authors, prominent among them Jonathan Cohen (1992), it would be useful or even necessary, if one is to clear up a series of puzzles in philosophy of mind, to draw a radical distinction between two kinds of mental states: belief and acceptance. The former would be involuntary, the latter voluntary or intentional. Belief would aim at truth, acceptance at success or utility. Belief would be passive, because shaped by evidence; acceptance, active and one could, for the sake of pragmatic concerns, accept something even if one doesn’t believe it. Belief would be context-independent; acceptance, context-dependent. Belief would be a matter of degrees, acceptance an all-or-nothing matter.
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