Abstract

A sufficient condition is presented for a policy to be a Condorcet winner when voters differ only in a single characteristic. The condition is that all voters' utility gradients with respect to the N different policy dimensions lie in the same plane in R N . If the policy is a set of commodity tax rates, then the condition is implied by the linearity of voters' (common) Engel curves. If the policy includes levels of public good provision, then the vectors of marginal willingness to pay for the various public goods of the different voters must all lie on the same line.

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