Choices under epistemic pluralism in economics

Abstract

At the core of the pluralist argument in economics is the rejection of the logical positivists' reductionist 'one size fits all' approach to scientific research. Instead, pluralists argue that there are multiple ways of constructing knowledge and that we cannot decide on the one best methodology or epistemic principle; in short, pluralistic knowledge is all there is. Yet, epistemic pluralism implies the absence of a single conclusive final methodology or epistemological principle, and consequently choice of methods, theories and concepts risk becoming relativistic under pluralism. In the light of the absence of objective choice criteria this paper argues: 1) that choices can be justified through consensuses in intellectual exchanges; 2) that MacIntyrian epistemological crises are a suitable basis for consensus under pluralism; 3) choice under pluralism, understood as migration between different frameworks, becomes necessary for the development of framework-dependent narratives and resulting policy implications.