Choices in Joint Venture and Acquisition Negotiation Behavior: The Power‐Dependence Relationship

Abstract

This paper tries to provide a theoretical explanation from case studies in which I analyzed the impact of firms’ behavior on negotiation processes. Particularly, it concentrates on the impact of the power‐dependence relationship on negotiation behavior choice in joint ventures and (nonhostile) acquisitions. Previous studies have found that negotiation behavior is a key factor in determining the results of negotiations and the subsequent implementation and performance of the strategy. Drawing on interview material from six cases, three acquisition negotiations and three joint venture negotiations, the empirical analysis allowed me to consider that the equilibrium situation of power‐dependence is more associated with integrative negotiation behaviors adopted by all the parties. This situation facilitates win/win agreements (negotiation success). However, the value‐creation basis appears as a key factor to be analyzed because its influence on (1) the perception of dependence and (2) the possible use of a power disequilibrium situation. This factor seems to be especially important in acquisition negotiations. Based upon my analysis, I recommend some issues to be studied and contrasted empirically in future research.