Chinese World Strategy and South Asia: The China Factor in Indo-Pakistani Relations

Abstract

WHEN THE PAKISTANI ARMY under General Niazi surrendered unconditionally to the Indians in December 1971, the IndiaPakistan War was officially terminated. As a direct outcome of the Pakistani defeat East Pakistan gained its independence and 75,000,000 people found themselves with independent, sovereign nation of their own-the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The war itself had lasted for only twelve days, a period during which the armies of India surprised the world when, with creative military organization and strategy, they expeditiously vanquished a formidable enemy in a vigorous operation which was described as an achievement reminiscent of the German blitzkrieg across France in 1940.1 The war and the resultant emergence of a new Asian state was not only the most important event to transpire in South Asia since the inception of Pakistan, but it had a profound impact upon the sensitive arena of international affairs as well. Moreover, beyond the general regional ramifications of the developments born out of the clash between two Third World nations, the individual global strategies of the great contemporary international powers, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), were by no means left unaffected. The war between India and Pakistan in 1971 was cause for much concern on the part of the Government of the PRC, which for most of the 1960s had nursed a steadily growing friendship with Pakistan while, for a number of reasons, China-India relations subsequent to the 1962 border flare-up between the latter two powers had undergone a process of virtual deterioration and collapse. By mid-1971, the future of the Indian subcontinent was at stake. The East Pakistan crisis which so violently culminated in the India-Pakistan War was a matter which