Abstract

Based on the three-dimensional ‘organizational goal – organizational field – organizational incen­tive’ analysis framework, this paper attempts to conduct a comparative and diachronic analysis of the behavioral logic of Chinese local governments’ early-warning information release in major epidemic outbreaks. The results of the research show that the organizational goal, field and incentive are highly rel­evant to different strategic choices of whether local governments should, will and are willing to perform their governance function; additionally, different combinations of these elements trigger different lo­cal government behaviors. The organizational goal, field and incentive are the starting point, turning point, and end point of local governments’ behavior­al logic, respectively, while the organizational field is prerequisite for the organizational incentive to work. The organizational goal – organizational field – organizational incentive sequence reflects the se­quence and interactive relationship of local govern­ments’ behavioral logic.

Highlights

  • In China, the governance of major epidemics falls under the responsibility of local governments

  • By exploring the local government’s early-warning information release in the three phases of the COVID-19 outbreak, which was caused by different combinations of the organizational goal being clear or unclear, the organizational field being appropriate or inappropriate, and the organizational incentive being strong or weak, we can explore the behavioral logic followed by the local government

  • Based on the whole organizational analysis process, we find that the organizational goal-organizational field-organizational incentive sequence reflects the sequence and interactive relationship of the behavioral logic of early-warning information release regarding major epidemic outbreaks

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Summary

Introduction

In China, the governance of major epidemics falls under the responsibility of local governments. This phenomenon has aroused the strong interest of scholars around the world in exploring the key variables that caused the sudden change in the behavioral pattern of Chinese local governments On this basis, this research proposes a three-dimensional organizational analysis framework of ‘organizational goals — organizational field — organizational incentives’ based on the disclosure of warning information by local governments. Referencing organizational theory, Zhou and Lian (2012) proposed a three-dimensional ‘control rights’ theory that included the goal-setting right, inspection right, and incentive right This theoretical model has been recognized as a unified theoretical framework for analyzing the governance structure, authority relationship, and behavioral types of the Chinese government and their changing process. Three-dimensional organizational analysis and theoretical hypotheses on the behavioral logic of early-warning information release

Starting point of the behavioral logic
Turning point of the behavioral logic
End point of the behavioral logic
Local governments’ behavior of not releasing
Local governments’ behavior of partial release
Local governments’ behavior of full release
Behavioral analysis of early-warning information release
Phase one Behavioral logic of local governments’ not releasing
Phase two Behavioral logic of local governments’ partial release
Phase three
Conclusion
Implications for organizational design
Full Text
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