Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to: (1) explain what the historical origins of the world-systems concept are; (2) present the background for building the Washington Consensus; (3) attempt to answer if the Beijing Consensus can be interpreted as an alternative to the Washington Consensus; (4) attempt to answer if the world-systems concept is applicable to the current engagement of China in Africa. The world-systems concept provides a useful framework for research in international relations, thanks to both its methodological and theoretical assumptions. As it urges for treating social sciences as an interconnected system, i.e. it believes there is a link between sociology, economics, anthropology and the political sciences, it enables studying the reality of current international relations. Chinese presence in Sub-Saharan Africa should be seen from different points of view, as it affects most spheres of the state: it influences the economics and societies of the African countries (e.g. employment, migration, environment), as well as politics (e.g. elections in Zambia in 2011 BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14952240 , 2011). Thus, the multi-dimensional analysis provided by the world-systems theory, though not free of drawbacks (e.g. lack of a detailed analysis of each variable), allows a comprehensive and holistic look at the issue of Chinese engagement in Africa. In terms of theoretical assumptions, its focus on system as a whole (which can be both studied at domestic and international levels) provides a basis for conducting studies at a regional level, treating Sub-Saharan Africa as the study’s object. The classic world-systems concept defines world economy as driven by the cores’ domination on the peripheries (described also as North–South division). Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa fit into the scheme of world-systems analysis as the peripheries, but China cannot be treated as a core state: it is a semi-periphery, as described by Wallerstein, and representative of Global South. China’s policy towards Sub-Saharan African countries has a distinct geo-economic pattern—a pattern of South–South cooperation. China’s relations with Sub-Saharan Africa are (at least on the rhetoric sphere) built on ‘mutual benefit’, ‘win–win cooperation’, and similar historical experience, though the partners are not on a similar level of economic development. The growing presence of China in Africa is, therefore, a challenge to traditional assumptions of world-systems analysis and should be further researched. The aim of this article is to answer whether the world-systems theory can be reinterpreted to serve as the framework for conducting research on Chinese engagement in the Global South, especially in Sub-Saharan African countries. The Washington Consensus regarded as the general shift from Keynesianism to neoliberal economic policies (i.e. in the broader sense than that given by Williamson in 1989) fits into the dialectic of world-systems analysis. The Washington Consensus principles provide a framework through which the core countries carry out their policies towards the peripheries. However, not only numerous scholars (Broad and Cavanagh World Policy Journal 16:79, 1999; Wallerstein Shall We Discuss Poverty?, 2010; Rodrik Journal of Economic Literature XLIV:973, 2006) but also politicians (As the former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown Washington Post 2009) declared the death of the Washington Consensus. It became even more apparent after the latest financial crisis. Joshua Ramo coined the term “the Beijing Consensus” to describe the Chinese model of cooperation, different from the Western. Is this distinction based on a reliable foundation? Is the Beijing Consensus an alternative to the Washington Consensus? Can the current unprecedented presence of China in Sub-Saharan Africa (as well as in other regions of the Global South) be seen as a part of the world-systems concept? Should the China–Africa relationship be the new direction of research in the world-systems concept?
Highlights
The purpose of this paper is to: (1) explain what the historical origins of the world-systems concept are; (2) present the background for building the Washington Consensus; (3) attempt to answer if the Beijing Consensus can be interpreted as an alternative to the Washington Consensus; (4) attempt to answer if the worldsystems concept is applicable to the current engagement of China in Africa
Joshua Ramo coined the term ‘‘the Beijing Consensus’’ to describe the Chinese model of cooperation, different from the Western. Is this distinction based on a reliable foundation? Is the Beijing Consensus an alternative to the Washington Consensus? Can the current unprecedented presence of China in Sub-Saharan Africa be seen as a part of the world-systems concept? Should the China–Africa relationship be the new direction of research in the world-systems concept?
Prebisch is considered to be one of the first structuralists. He assumed that the bad state of economy in Latin America was structure-based, i.e. it resulted from the structure, and that the foundations of international economic relations were based on dependence
Summary
Dependency theory is, within the French Annales school (Fernand Braudel) and Marxian works, one of the major intellectual blocks of Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory (Wallerstein 2004a, p. 10, c, p. 10). Researchers distinguish two or three categories of states, and the division is based on the existence of the capitalist system: metropolises and satellites as in the dependency theory (Andre Frank) and centres (core), semi-peripheries and peripheries as in the world-systems analysis (Immanuel Wallerstein). The actuality of the world-systems concept can be seen in the obvious examples of the division of labour (and not just in cheap manpower in Asia, producing goods for corporations with dominant Western capital, and in the outsourcing of manpower: in the so-called ‘shared-service centres’, using specialists based in India, for instance), and in the use of raw materials of the Global South countries (Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia) for core states, or for other developing countries (e.g. China). 5.0 3.5 6.2 3.9 7.0 7.1 7.5 10.6 4.1a 5.3 6.1 3.8 a ‘‘South Asia and West Asia have been the exceptions, as their exports accelerated in 2011, but this is somewhat misleading, as this increase was from low levels in 2010 when some large economies in these regions, such as India and Turkey, failed to bounce back above the levels they had registered in 2008’’ (UNCTAD 2012)
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