Chinese Economic Statecraft in Indonesia/East Timor: A Historical and Regional Perspective

Geoffrey C Gunn

doi:10.1177/18681026211042029

Abstract

From inside China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), two southern tier nations offer contrary perspectives as to the efficacy of Beijing’s economic statecraft, namely Indonesia and East Timor. While obviously asymmetric in practically every respect, nevertheless a careful study of these two nations’ bilateral links with China over long and short times offers salutary lessons on infrastructure financing in particular. Several interconnected inquiries are interposed. In a nation known for its competing political elites and support bases, how successful has China been in micro-managing its relations with Jakarta over trade and investment deals even carrying through to a post-authoritarian order? How has newly independent albeit aid-dependent Timor-Leste been able to parlay the China connection? Mixing documentary with primary research in situ, the inclusion of the East Timor case adds a missing link in the growing literature on the BRI.

Highlights

The literature on economic statecraft is replete with real-world examples, just as comparative studies of case studies lend to theory building
The inclusion of Timor-Leste adds a missing link in the growing literature on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), allowing important lessons to be derived in future studies not excluding other islands or mini-states
In pairing Indonesia and East Timor as Southern Tier nations with respect to China’s BRI, this article has demonstrated that a history of the recent and even the distant past matters when it comes to the exercise of China’s economic statecraft, not excepting its historical Nanyang iteration

Summary

Introduction

The literature on economic statecraft is replete with real-world examples, just as comparative studies of case studies lend to theory building. Keywords China, economic statecraft, political economy, Indonesia, East Timor

Results

Conclusion