Chinese Confrontational Politics in the Age of Globalization

Abstract

The paper problematises the rise of confrontational Chinese politics and explains it in terms of limited domestic political openness and representation. I begin by tracing the inconsistency between confrontational politics and economic globalization, and the presumption that globalization, and consequent homogenization, will lessen confrontational politics, at least among states that are highly integrated in the global economy through participation in global production networks. Contemporary economic globalization, unlike 19th century ‘globalization of consumption’ when consumers, more than any other societal group, had an interest in liberal trade, includes also a ‘globalization of production’ which has given businesses, as well as consumers, an overriding interest in preservation and protection of liberal trade. Logic suggests that the benefits of economic globalization will deter states from confrontational politics, partly through greater business involvement in ensuring cooperative inter-state relations that do not threaten the expansion of global production networks. Global production defines contemporary economic globalization and has important payoffs in terms of growth and prosperity. It is not surprising, therefore, that even major economic crises have not witnessed any significant departure from liberal trade, a reality that is very different from the pre-globalization period. Yet, China, despite its deep engagement in the global economy, appears to be pursuing a confrontation path and this paper is an attempt to explain this anomaly. I will look at several explanations and conclude that the main reason is the lack of business representation in Chinese domestic politics, such that commercial interests are imperfectly reflected in contemporary Chinese foreign policies.