Chinese Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons, 1964–9

Abstract

10 1969 was not only the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Republic (C.P.R.); it also marked the culmination of China's fifth year as a nuclear power. During this five-year period there were 10 detonations, three of which were thermonuclear and one of which was tested underground. At least one of the warheads was fired from a guided missile. According to one estimate, current defence expenditures amount to 10 per cent. of China's gross national product, and one-fifth of this outlay is devoted to nuclear research and development alone. A large portion of China's advanced scientific and technical manpower has also been assigned to this field. Although an adequate delivery system for this limited nuclear capability, as of November 1971, is not known to be operational, China's progress in the research and development of advanced weapons has clearly been substantial. The launching of Chinese satellites in 1970 and 1971 and the likelihood of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test in the near future are further evidence of major technological achievement. Peking's entry, then, into the “nuclear club” has been a major concern of China's leaders; it has also had significant consequences for American defence planners. The explicit rationale for the Nixon Administration's expansion of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in early 1970, for example, was to guard against the possibility of a Chinese attack in the 1980s and thus to assure the reliability of American defence commitments in East Asia and the Pacific.