China's Sanctions on North Korea After Its Fourth Nuclear Test

Abstract

This article aims to evaluate the will of the Chinese government to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2270 following North Korea's fourth nuclear test (1 January 2016), thereby seeking out the implications on China's sanctions against the DPRK after its fifth nuclear test (9 September 2016). The results of analysis in this article can be summed up as follows. First, the following instances capture the willingness of the Chinese government regarding the implementation of sanctions against the DPRK: (i) China agreed to stronger sanctions against North Korea (Resolution 2270); (ii) China boasted about its wholehearted support for – and complete willingness to implement – the sanctions at home and abroad; and (iii) upon the agreement, Beijing revealed the lists of items banned from export to North Korea and items subject to additional sanctions more promptly than before. Second, in spite of China's expressed willingness, the following instances demonstrate that there remain some limitations to Beijing's will regarding a thorough implementation of sanctions against Pyongyang: (i) the Chinese government argued that the United States should be responsible for sanctions against the North after its fourth nuclear test; (ii) China proposed the parallel approach of pursuing denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and a peace treaty; (iii) China placed an emphasis on improving the living conditions of North Koreans; and (iv) China expressed opposition to deployment of terminal high‐altitude area defense on the Korean Peninsula. Third, such reactions are indicative of China's key essentials behind enforcing sanctions against the DPRK, which are the pursuit of Chinese national interests and the prevention of loss of those interests. To that end, China attempts to bypass the United States’ monitoring and pressure, considers the growing strategic value of North Korea as a result of intensifying conflicts between the United States and China, and induces the DPRK into a realm of dialogue. The fact that China needs to secure influence over North Korea and maintain the North Korean regime in a stable state even after its fifth nuclear test indicates that its sanctions against North Korea will be implemented within a boundary of not causing the regime collapse or chaos.