China's Perception of ASEAN Centrality and the Prospects of a Middle Power Nexus

Abstract

Hitherto, ASEAN centrality has been a critical feature of the Asian regional integration process. It was seen as a suitable “driver” of the regionalization process. Today, that role is being strained by US-China strategic competition, competing visions of the region, namely the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), and the COVID-19 pandemic. Considering this trio of strains on ASEAN, how does China perceive ASEAN centrality within the context of Asian regionalism? Can ASEAN establish and function as a middle power institution able to contribute to shaping the evolution of the Indo-Pacific region? This chapter explores these questions within the context of the theme of this volume, India-ASEAN-Japan triangularity vis-à-vis China. ASEAN’s proclivity towards middle power diplomacy and China’s perception of ASEAN are interrelated and follow a logic of negative reinforcement. As ASEAN becomes more cohesive in its middle power diplomacy, the Chinese perceive it as more of a challenge to Beijing’s core interests in the region, and thus we see China attempt to fracture ASEAN unity. Concomitantly, as China becomes more assertive in the region, ASEAN strives to find ways to strengthen its solidarity and strategic autonomy. This chapter finds that ASEAN is becoming increasingly willing to work with extra-regional partners through classic balancing mechanisms that aim to connect ASEAN to all stakeholders in the region through competing and complementary institutions and agreements.