China's North Korea Policy: Rethink or Recharge?

Abstract

Abstract: There has been much speculation lately about a Chinese rethink on North Beijing has clearly been exasperated with Pyongyang. What is going on with Beijing's Pyongyang policy? Has there actually been a reassessment of the PRC's policy toward the DPRK? Is there a military component to this policy, and what do we know about planning by China's People's Liberation Army for a Korea contingency? This article answers those questions. ********** There has been much speculation lately about a Chinese rethink on North (1) Certainly, Beijing's exasperation with Pyongyang has been palpable. The degree of debate evident in the People's Republic of (PRC) over its policy toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in recent years is unprecedented and comes on the heels of a series of particularly provocative acts by Pyongyang. (2) Since 2006 these acts include a series of missile tests and nuclear tests each conducted apparently without prior notification or consultation with Beijing. Additionally, strains in bilateral relations were triggered by provocations such as the torpedoing of a Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy corvette, the Cheonan, and the shelling of Yeongpyong Island in 2010. Further strains in Beijing-Pyongyang ties followed the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, and the elevation of his son Kim Jong Un to the position of DPRK supreme leader. Perhaps the most recent provocation from the PRC perspective was the execution of Kim Jong Un's uncle, Jang Sung Taek, in December 2013. Jang appears to have been China's key interlocutor with the current North administration and his death came as a great shock to Beijing. Moreover, it raised questions about Pyongyang's policy direction and introduced uncertainties into the DPRK's relationship with the PRC. (3) China, of course, experienced its own leadership transition at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012 and the National People's Congress in March 2013 with the appointment of a generation of leaders. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and PRC President Xi Jinping, while maintaining general continuity with the policies of his predecessor Hu Jintao, has sought to put his own imprimatur on the affairs of state, espousing a China Dream and proposing a new type of great power relationship with the United States. Do these changes include a revamped North Korea policy? Chinese officials appear to be changing the term they use to label the bloody struggle waged on the Peninsula six decades ago. During Vice President Li Yuanchao's visit to North Korea in July 2013 to commemorate the crucible of the China-North Korea alliance, Li purposely used the simple phrase Korean rather than the title that has been used for five decades, the War to Resist America and Aid Korea. (4) This semantic change may be as much about a public relations effort to improve relations with the United States as it is about signaling a change in the PRC's perceptions of Pyongyang or policy toward North Beijing appears eager not to antagonize the United States unnecessarily. But may also intend to signal to North Korea not to take its longtime ally for granted. In any event, a high level of frustration with North Korea endures and this has manifested itself in a remarkable public airing of anger and outrage by Chinese scholars, analysts, and members of the public. One episode in May 2012 triggered a particularly vitriolic reaction from Chinese netizens: the kidnapping of twenty-eight Chinese fishermen by North naval vessels. The story unleashed a torrent of anti-DPRK sentiment becoming one of the hottest trending topics in China's microblogging sites. (5) Although these open displays of deep disaffection with North Korea are genuine, they do not appear to signify a policy shift by Beijing toward Pyongyang. Indeed, the public airing of ire about China's North Korea problem has yet to translate into a sea change in Beijing's policy towards Pyongyang. …