China's Himalayan Frontiers

Abstract

T tHE 'boundary dispute' between India and China stems from the Chinese demand for over 50,000 square miles of territory adjoining the frontier, territory which is, and has always been, a part of India. China has already occupied by force some I2,000 square miles in north-eastern Kashmir. Tension is at present most acute in this area; it could die down-or flare-up in some other sector of the 2,500-mile frontier. No one can chart this crisis in advance. But it is clear that if the Chinese demand were conceded, the Himalayas and its ancillary ranges would cease to be the frontier between the two great civilizations, as they have been for ages past, and Chinese power would reach down to the edge of the Indian plains. This state of affairs is in sad contrast to the good relations which prevailed at first between the newly-independent India and the People's Republic of China. Looking back, the manner in which China abused India's confidence and eventually brought this claim into the open is itself significant-and disturbing. For some years after independence India continued to believe, as on the record she had every right to do, that her northern boundary was firmly fixed and universally accepted, not least by China. But from I954 onwards, there were a series of border violations. India promptly brought them to the attention of the Chinese Government, in polite and friendly terms. Her Notes went unanswered, or she was told that the area was in Chinese territory. Then, in I958, came the incident at Longju, in the Eastern Sector, when the Chinese opened fire on the Indians and captured the outpost. This was followed in October by the attack on an Indian patrol near the Kongka Pass, in Ladakh, with some loss of life on the Indian side. Even before I954, India had begun to express concern at Chinese maps, which wrongly showed large tracts of Indian territory as belonging to China. Mr Chou En-Lai was soothing, at first; he assured Mr Nehru that these were reprints of old maps which would be revised in due course. In November I958, in response to repeated Indian complaints, a somewhat enigmatic Chinese Note curtly informed India that 'a new way of drawing the boundary would be decided upon' after 'consultations'. A few months later, in January I959, China for the first time took exception to the Indian maps, 'particularly in the Western sector'. There was still no suggestion that the Chinese maps were correct. Finally, in September and December of that year, Mr Chou En-Lai showed his hand: in two Notes to 472