Abstract

INTRODUCTION The value of China's currency, the renminbi (RMB), and the conduct of China's exchange rate policy have generated intense debate in academic and international policy circles. The RMB was pegged from 1994 until mid-2005 at 8.28 yuan to the US dollar. China shifted in 2005 to a policy of loosely pegging the RMB to a basket of major currencies. Since then, the RMB has appreciated against the dollar, and the current RMB/dollar exchange rate stands at roughly 6:30. Over the same period, RMB generally depreciated against the Euro, falling from 10.06 in June 2005 to 10.79 in June 2008. With the 2007/2008 financial crisis, however, the Euro has depreciated and the RMB/Euro exchange rate presently stands at 8.99. Throughout this period, China has intervened actively in foreign exchange markets to prevent the RMB from appreciating faster by selling RMB and buying other major currencies (mostly US dollars). A number of economic commentators argue that China's policies amount to market-distorting manipulation. For example, C. Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute for International Economics recently suggested that the RMB must appreciate by approximately 40 per cent against the dollar to correct current and urged the United States to take multilateral, and if necessary unilateral action, to pressure China to change its ways. (1) Michael Mussa and Arvind Subramanian have expressed similar views. (2) Politicians have become involved. Trade officials from both the US and Europe have argued that Chinese practices unfairly distort trade, amounting to the equivalent of a subsidy to exports and a tariff on imports that would violate World Trade Organization (WTO) rules if imposed directly. US President Barack Obama stated in November 2009, for example, that China's current trade surplus is directly related to its manipulation of its currency's value. He concurrently promised to use all diplomatic means at his disposal to achieve change in China's manipulation of the value of its currency, a practice that contributes to massive global imbalances and provides Chinese companies with an unfair competitive advantage. (3) During the 2012 US elections season, Mr. Mitt Romney, one of the two presidential candidates, promised--while bashing President Obama, his opponent, of failing to act against China's currency manipulation--that if he was to be elected, he would label China a currency manipulator from day one. (4) Over the past few years, various proposals for action against China have been put forward in the US Congress. These range from insisting that the Treasury Department refer the matter to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to requiring that the US Trade Representative bring a formal complaint to the WTO, treating China's alleged manipulation as a source of dumping or countervailable subsidies that would permit the imposition of antidumping or countervailing duties on Chinese imports. IMF case studies have shown that the IMF has never identified a certain member engaging in exchange manipulation, or indicated that the acts of any of its members amount to foreign exchange manipulation. Theoretically, the RMB exchange rate issue can become the subject matter of WTO dispute settlement proceedings only when China's trade partner(s) (e.g., the US and/or the European Union) lodge a complaint against China in the WTO dispute settlement body. Before moving to an action in the WTO, the governments of China's trade partners must take into consideration the translation of China's exchange rate policies (and specifically the magnitude of its exchange rate misalignment) into equivalent real trade policies that could then be more readily evaluated under the rules of the WTO, e.g., under Article XV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, Article XXIII of the GATT or Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). …

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