Abstract
China’s leaders are aware that the country’s emergence as a major power in the twenty-first century is preconditioned by acquiring soft power and a favourable national image. Culture and cultural projection are seen as essential resources in international strategy, which is conceived with regard to the domestic political objectives of the Communist Party of China (CPC). This paper examines the conceptual framework of China’s cultural soft power during Xi Jinping’s first term as general secretary (2012–2017). Drawing mostly on official statements by central party organs, the research identifies the rationale, values, and instruments of China’s cultural soft power and national-image-building strategy, and also briefly assesses the limitations of this strategy. The article finds that CPC leadership does not clearly differentiate between domestic and foreign cultural work and instead considers domestic cultural security and international soft-power-building a single ideational and discursive enterprise designed to maintain the CPC’s rule and gain international acknowledgement for it. The alleged uniqueness of China’s culture and civilization, and, therefore, the China development model, is the main argument of this discourse. The central leadership’s concept of culture as a political instrument for maintaining power thus shows little innovation from previous eras of the CPC’s cultural governance. Its impact thus remains limited by the objective of legitimating authoritarian politics and compromises the CPC’s efforts to present China as a major cultural power.
Highlights
China’s leaders are aware that the country’s emergence as a major power in the twenty-first century is preconditioned by acquiring soft power and a favourable national image
This study explores the vision of the central leadership because this vision has a major impact on the practical doings of all political actors in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
The above-described functions of ideology in the post-Mao PRC are effected through propaganda, which can be understood in a party-state context as an “attempt to transmit social and political values in the hope of affecting people’s thinking, emotions, and thereby behavior” (Kenez 1985: 4)
Summary
All CPC activities are organized into several major “systems” (xitong 系统), or policy spheres, that are coordinated in a top-down manner by the highest-ranking party leaders. The above-described functions of ideology in the post-Mao PRC are effected through propaganda, which can be understood in a party-state context as an “attempt to transmit social and political values in the hope of affecting people’s thinking, emotions, and thereby behavior” (Kenez 1985: 4). As a part of the crackdown on the “superstitious” Falungong in 2000, Jiang articulated the concept of “scientific civilization” (kexue wenming 科学文明), which contrasted with “superstition and ignorance” (mixin yumei 迷信愚昧; People’s Daily 2000) He included culture in his Important Thinking of the Three Represents, in which he argues that the party “represents the orientation of China’s advanced culture”. Hu’s concept includes an ideational aspect as it seeks to shape and transform a “healthy” worldview and morality It regards “cultural construction” (wenhua jianshe 文化建设) as on par with the economic, political, and social development of China
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