Abstract

China's emergency management (EM) system has undergone a series of reforms and organizational changes since the SARS epidemic in 2003. However, institutional segmentation, unbalanced power for the Emergency Management Office, pervasive internal corruption, and state monopoly control are threats to the administration's goal of resilient and modern EM systems. The new round of 2018 reforms was intended to promote integration through the establishment of the Ministry of Emergency Management and related institutional restructuring involving power redistribution. The reforms are nevertheless likely to face some potential problems like the operation of a super‐ministry, interorganizational integration, state‐society relations, and supervision. Through field interviews, the article investigates and uncovers issues in China's EM system and the perception from government sectors at different levels. The article suggests that cooperative governance in coping with state‐society relations and decentralization of power could be of great significance for future EM reform in China.Related ArticlesAsh, John. 2010. “New Nuclear Energy, Risk, and Justice: Regulatory Strategies for an era of Limited Trust.” Politics & Policy 38 (2): 255‐284. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2010.00237.xBrogan, Michael James. 2017. “Evaluating Risk and Natural gas Pipeline Safety.” Politics & Policy 45 (4): 657‐680. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12211Neill, Katharine A., and John C. Morris. 2012. “A Tangled web of Principals and Agents: Examining the Deepwater Horizon oil Spill through a Principal–Agent Lens.” Politics & Policy 40 (4): 629‐656. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00371.x/full

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