China’s New Role in the Nuclear Confrontation

Abstract

China’s uncharacteristically proactive conflict-management role in the latest (second) nuclear standoff between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) suggests major shifts in its strategic calculus. At least until the end of 2002, China maintained a risk-averse “who me?” posture, a strategy of calculated ambiguity and equidistance. Growing security concerns about possible U.S. recklessness in trying to resolve the North Korean nuclear challenge have led to a new hands-on preventive diplomacy in Beijing. In pursuing the origins and implications of the change, this article explains China’s role shift, critically evaluates the possibilities and limitations of China’s influence, especially in Pyongyang and Washington, and concludes by looking at the North Korean nuclear issue in the context of the asymmetrical U.S.-China-DPRK triangle. A set of policy recommendations are suggested for the peaceful resolution of the nuclear standoff on the Korean peninsula as well as the creation of a functionalist working peace system in Northeast Asia.