Abstract

In fall 2004, the president of China, Hu Jintao, embarked upon a trip to Latin America that sometimes seemed more a coronation than a diplomatic offensive. In Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Argentina, Hu was received with the highest honors of a state guest, while local legislators battled to hold receptions for him and for the delegation of Chinese businesses searching for new investments in the region. Latin businesspeople hosted Hu at barbeques and welcomed him into their factories. Latin leaders recognized China as a market economy, one of Beijing’s major goals, and lavished praise on Hu, with the Brazilian president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, announcing, “We want a partnership that integrates our economies and serves as a paradigm for South-South cooperation.” Hu also delivered concrete signs of China’s growing relationship with Latin America. The Chinese leader signed $30 billion worth of new investment deals, upgraded bilateral trade ties with Brazil and announced an “all-weather strategic partnership” with the Latin giant, and signed some 400 agreements with Latin American nations on a range of topics. Shortly after Hu’s trip, Chinese vice president Zeng Qinghong led his own entourage of Chinese officials and business leaders to Latin America, where they signed a new deal on oil and gas exploration with Caracas and offered Venezuela $700 million in credits. Hu’s grand tour of Latin America surprised many U.S. policymakers and opinion leaders, who have long considered the region the United States’ natural sphere of influence, and who have not contended with another external competitor in the region in decades. An article published in Foreign Affairs wondered if Washington was “losing Latin America.” A Senate aide told the New York Times, “They’re taking advantage of it. They’re taking advantage of the fact that we don’t care as much as we should about Latin America.” Congress convened hearings to examine China’s presence in the Western Hemisphere, and the White House instituted a dialogue with China to explore the two powers’ aims in the region.

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