China’s Conflict-Management Approach to the Nuclear Standoff on the Korean Peninsula

Abstract

This article provides an analysis and assessment of China’s uncharacteristically proactive conflict-management (CM) diplomacy in the U.S.-North Korea (DPRK) nuclear standoff on the Korean peninsula from 2002 to 2005. In the first of four sections, the focus is on the global context and conditions that gave rise to CM studies as a new field of international relations research in the West. The second section argues that three proximate and underlying causes— greater danger, greater stakes, and greater leverage—catapulted Beijing into the terra incognita of a CM leadership role. The third section examines the shift in China’s role as well as the style and substance of this approach. The fourth section critically evaluates the possibilities and limitations of China’s conflict-management diplomacy for the resolution of the U.S.- DPRK nuclear standoff. The conclusion is a brief assessment of future prospects for establishing a more peaceful and prosperous regional order in Northeast Asia either through the ongoing Six Party Talks or through some permanent Northeast Asian security regime coming out of the success or failure of the six-party process.