China's Arctic Policy and Engagement: Review and Prospects

Abstract

China's Arctic Policy and Engagement:Review and Prospects Yitong Chen (bio) The Arctic is experiencing greatly accelerated change under the influence of climate change, economic globalization, and world power shifts. After China became an official observer state of the Arctic Council in 2013, its involvement in Arctic affairs has grown increasingly and intensively. It has been particularly prominent in three areas: science, economics, and governance. When China became an observer state, few people could have predicted the extent to which the world would change over the next decade. At that time, China did not stand out so much from the other four new observer countries in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India). Features such as Japan's close scientific cooperation with Arctic countries, South Korea's shipbuilding skills, and Singapore's important shipping position are why they have been granted observer status. A year later, however, a series of black swan events occurred, starting with the Crimean crisis in 2014. Like dominoes, the world landscape has since shifted dramatically. In 2016, Britain announced its departure from the European Union, while Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. After then U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo delivered an infamous speech at the ministerial meeting in 2019 warning China and Russia against "aggressive behavior," the Arctic Council closed for the first time without issuing a joint statement.1 In the speech, Pompeo used metaphorical and parallel questions to warn about China's presence in the Arctic, such as "Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims?"2 However, this situation cannot happen because China has no legal right to claim any territorial sovereignty in the Arctic. Moreover, the only territorial dispute in the Arctic—over the small island Hans Island between Canada [End Page 29] and Denmark (via Greenland)—was peacefully settled with an agreement.3 When Covid-19 arrived, China was the first to respond with a strict epidemic prevention policy, but the country also entered a three-year self-imposed quarantine that slowed communication with the international community. At the same time, however, China has further deepened cooperation with Russia. In February 2022, after meeting at the Winter Olympics opening ceremony in Beijing, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin issued a joint statement that announced their intention to develop a "polycentric world order."4 The world now is a very different place than it was in 2013. China released its official white paper on Arctic policy in 2018.5 The white paper marked the culmination of a five-year period of gradual outreach and initial involvement in the Arctic governance arena as an Arctic Council observer state. Therefore, its release announced the beginning of the first year of the country's full participation in Arctic affairs in a mature and steady manner, guided by defined objectives and principles. This essay reviews China's involvement in Arctic affairs, using the white paper as a blueprint. Following a discussion of China's Arctic identity, the subsequent two sections concentrate on Arctic science and technology development and international cooperation in polar science. The essay then concludes by commenting on the implications of the current Russia-Ukraine conflict for Arctic governance and China's position and prospects in the region. China's Identity in the Arctic If there were keywords to describe China's identity in the Arctic, they would be "near-Arctic state" and "stakeholder." The logic behind the description of China as a near-Arctic state is that it is one of the continental states closest to the Arctic Circle. The proximity is not only geographic. Environmental changes in the Arctic have caused a series of direct impacts in China as well as indirect implications for its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, fishery, marine industry, and other sectors. [End Page 30] The white paper has to some extent responded to long-standing international speculation and questions about China's Arctic position and whether China will disrupt the established international order in the Arctic. However, China's self-perception as a near-Arctic state remains the most attacked concept in the paper. For example, one scholar...