China Reassesses the Superpowers

Abstract

IMPORTANT CHANGES OCCURRED in 1982 in China's approach to international relations. Beijing began to highlight differences between Chinese and American interests and to explore the potential for more normal relations with the Soviet Union. At first, it appeared that this shift in posture might simply be a tactic to pressure U.S. policy-makers into setting limits on arms sales to Taiwan. This interpretation seemed justified in the light of comments by high-level Chinese officials, during and after Vice President Bush's visit to Beijing in May, that the major-or even only-obstacle to improved Sino-U.S. relations was the Taiwan issue.' Such comment implied that a change in Washington's policy toward Taiwan would result in a return to China's earlier public posture that pointed toward closer strategic cooperation with the U.S. But when Chinese criticism of the U.S. persisted after the August 17 Sino-U.S. Communique, it became clear that the changes had deeper roots and other aims. In fact, while the re-emergence of problems with the U.S. over Taiwan beginning in mid-1980 served as a catalyst for the modification of China's foreign policy, the process surfaced earlier, and a number of domestic and international factors have shaped the outcome. The broad range of interrelated changes that have taken place in China's approach to international affairs have affected most of its important relationships. This points to a well-considered decision rather than mere pressure tactics, since it would be embarrassing, if not damaging to China's reputation, to reverse course again. Moreover, General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang, who are likely to lead China during the next decade, have become personally associated with the construction of the new framework.