China in 1980: Modernization and Its Discontents

Abstract

IT WAS THE BEST OF TIMES, it was the worst of times. The year 1980 saw the approaching culmination of Deng Xiaoping's drive for power-an ascent that in the view of many observers, noting Deng's broad and deep political base and his forward-looking, pragmatic policy inclinations, bode well for the PRC. The institutionalization of the successor regime proceeded apace, with the construction of a few new organs -e.g., Chen Yiin's Committee for the Inspection of Discipline and Peng Zhen's Legal Commission-and the revitalization and frequent convention of a host of old ones-e.g., the Secretariat and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. All of this seemed to signal a smooth transition from the seasoned veterans now holding the reigns to their somewhat younger (but still veteran) successors. Although economic growth declined somewhat, the new leadership seemed to have the situation well in hand. True, the democracy movement had received a setback-the few remaining tabloids were forced to cease publication, and the four great freedoms were withdrawn-but the democracy activists were generally considered disruptive troublemakers anyhow. After months of reports and denials of inner-Party struggle, suspicions of a split could no longer be denied following the resignations of the small gang of four, but despite this and other personnel shifts the leadership managed to convey an overall sense of optimism, unity, and forward momentum. Despite these favorable omens, there were signs of cynicism abroad in the land that should not be ignored despite their somewhat inchoate manifestations. The status of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought -still sanctioned, after all, as the regime's official ideology-seems to have declined along with the reputation of the Chairman. Support even for Deng Xiaoping, until recently esteemed as a symbol of the emanci-