Chimpanzee theory of mind?: the long road to strong inference

Abstract

Timing of the evolution of theory of mind Here is an extreme view of the evolution of theory of mind: prior to about four million years ago no organism ever paused to consider its own mental experiences or the mental experiences of others. This view carries with it the implication that the reproductive payoffs that led to the selection for theory of mind began to be realised only during the course of human evolution. It also implies that for some (as-yet-unknown) reason the complex social groups common to many mammals had not produced the right mixture of social or physical problems sufficient to drive the evolution of neural material capable of representing mental states. In short, this view implies that it was something about the unique history of human evolution that led to our pervasive and unshakeable folk psychology of mind. Of course, there are even more extreme views than this. For example, it has been maintained by some that theory of mind emerged coincident with the evolution of human language or that it is merely an illusion created by linguistic conventions (e.g., Wittgenstein, 1953; Langer, 1942; Lutz, 1992). Still more extreme would be the view espoused by some cultural anthropologists that beliefs about the mind are relative constructs peculiar to the cultures in which they are formed (e.g., Geertz, 1973; Mauss, 1984; La Fontaine, 1984).