Children's third-party punishment does not change depending on the prospect of future interaction.

Abstract

Children pay a cost to punish third parties for unfairness. However, theoretical debates highlight that such behaviors could reflect a strategic attempt to manipulate others in future interactions. The personal deterrence hypothesis claims that punishment is motivated to deter future unfairness toward punishers. Here we tested this hypothesis with a total of n = 248 five- to 10-year-olds. In two experiments, participants witnessed that a divider shared resources either fairly or selfishly with a third party. Participants learned that the same divider (same divider condition) or a new divider (different divider condition) would subsequently decide how to share resources with the participant. If children's punishment is motivated by personal deterrence, they should punish unfairness more often in the same divider condition (vs. different divider). Conversely, if children fear retaliation from dividers, they should punish dividers less often in the same divider condition (vs. different divider). Children intervened by taking resources away from the divider (Experiment 1) or by sending a disapproving or an approving verbal message (Experiment 2). Children were more likely to punish unfair than fair allocations through material punishment and disapproving messages, while being more likely to reward fair than unfair allocations by sending approving messages. However, children did so at the same level regardless of their future divider's identity. We discuss how these results speak to a children's emerging concern with fairness and how it challenges the notion that children punish for self-oriented reasons as suggested by the personal deterrence hypothesis. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).