Children's Social Reasoning in Context: Reply to Gabennesch

Abstract

Children's social reasoning is multifaceted. Moral judgments of justice, welfare, and rights are an important aspect of domains of social reasoning that are not merely the arbitrary and relative products of social formations. In defining all social formations as conventions that are either reified or accurately perceived as arbitrary and relative human inventions, Gabennesch relegates the moral concepts of many philosophers, moral leaders, and laypersons to ethnocentrism and reification. In the process, he fails to distinguish between metaethics relating to the source of knowledge and the form of knowledge. He also fails to account for distinctions between conventionality and moral concepts that do not constitute realism or reification. His review of the evidence of moral realism in children is selective in that isolated findings are taken out of the context of a particular study and of the entire body of evidence. Moreover, he has incorrectly interpreted many of the findings he cites in support of childhood realism. We present a summary of 48 studies demonstrating that children distinguish morality and convention. Gabennesch's perceptual metaphors hinge on an exaggerated role for conventionality in social formations at the expense of other complex social phenomena.