CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND CHILDREN'S LIVES

Abstract

A friend who lived in New York could not see the sky from her windows. To discover the day's weather she had to peer at a glass-fronted building opposite, which offered a blurred reflection of part of the sky above her own building. I shall argue that when we take rights as fundamental in looking at ethical issues in children's lives we also get an indirect, partial and blurred picture. If no more direct, clearer and fuller account can be had, we will have to rely on any oblique and partial light which a theory of children's fundamental rights provides. If a clearer, more direct and more complete view of ethical aspects of children's lives is available, we would have good reason to prefer it. We may begin with a reminder of the appeal and importance of thinking in terms of children's rights. Children easily become victims. If they had rights, redress would be possible. Rather than being powerless in the face of neglect, abuse, molestation and mere ignorance they (like other oppressed groups) would have legitimate and (in principle) enforceable claims against others. Although they (unlike many other oppressed groups) cannot claim their rights for themselves, this is no reason for denying them rights. Rather it is reason for setting up institutions that can monitor those who have children in their charge and intervene to enforce rights. The Aristotelian thought that justice is a relation between equals, so inappropriate in dealings with children, is to be rejected. The lives of children are no private matter, but a public concern which can be met by fostering children's rights. Many aspects of this view seem to me plausible. I shall not query the thought that children's lives are a public concern or the aim of securing positive (legal, institutional, customary) rights for children. I shall, however, query whether children's positive rights are best grounded by appeals to fundamental (moral, natural, human) rights. This conclusion does not threaten children's positive rights, which may have other grounds; nor does it deny that children have fundamental rights. Rather I shall