Children's use of counterfactual thinking in causal reasoning

Abstract

Research on children's causal thinking has emphasized the perception of temporal and spatial contiguity between cause and effect. However, our causal judgements often involve a contrast between a perceived sequence (A, then B) and a counterfactual case (in the absence of A, then not B). In three experiments, children's capacity for such counterfactual thinking was assessed. In Experiment 1, children aged 3–5 years observed a sequence such as A causing B. Subsequently, they replied quite accurately to a question about a counterfactual sequence, for example: “What if A had not occurred, then B or not B?”. In Experiment 2, children were asked about two counterfactual antecedents, one that would not have caused B, and one that (like the actual antecedent) would also have caused B. Children differentiated between the two types of antecedent. Finally, in Experiment 3, children heard stories in which the protagonist chose a course of action that led to a minor mishap (e.g., drawing with a black pen and getting inky fingers), having rejected an option that would have prevented it in experimental stories (e.g., using a pencil) or an option that would have led to an equivalent outcome in control stories (e.g., using a blue pen). Children aged 3 and 4 years often cited the failure to adopt another course of action as the cause of the mishap and, particularly in experimental stories, they focused on the rejection of the alternative option. Children's use of counterfactual thinking is discussed in relation to contemporary accounts of causal reasoning.