Children's Reasoning about Interpersonal and Moral Conflicts

Abstract

1991,62,629-644.2 studies were conductedto determine if children make judgments about both justice and interpersonal relations in con-flictful situations. In Study 1, 48 subjects (24 males and 24 females) in the third, sixth, and ninthgrades (mean ages = 8.40, 11.38, 14.38 years) were administered 2 stories entailing conflictsbetween justice and interpersonal concerns. Ghildren judged and justified acts in 4 conditionssystematically varying interpersonal and justice concerns. Children generally gave priority tojustice and rights over friendship, based primarily on considerations of welfare or rights. In Study2, 76 subjects (39 males and 37 females) in the third, sixth, and ninth grades (mean ages =9.08, 12.10, 14.92 years) were presented with 3 stories entailing conflicts between justice andinterpersonal relations. Subjects gave greater priority to interpersonal considerations in Study 2than in Study 1, and their evaluations varied according to the salience of the different concerns.In both studies, few gender differences were obtained. The results demonstrate that acrossdevelopment, concerns with justice and interpersonal reJationships coexist in judgments of maleand female children, and that the ways they are applied depend on the situation.A complex and vexing problem for moral claims of strangers is problematic, cer-moral theory and research on social develop- tainly from a subjective perspective, andment is the connection between interper- perhaps from an ethical one (Scheffler, 1988;sonal relationships and particularistic or Williams, 1981).generalized moral obligations. Interpersonaland moral considerations are important as- The link between interpersonal reia-pects of social interactions that can be in tionships and considerations of justice,conflict. On the one hand, it is recognized rights, or welfare has been considered inthat persons in close relationships (e.g., several approaches to social and moral de-friends, family) have special obligations to velopment (e.g., Damon, 1977; Selman,each other. On the other hand, concerns 1980). In particular, there is an ongoing de-with issues like justice, rights, and welfare bate regarding how to best characterize theare thought to entail obligations that often development of justice and interpersonaltranscend particular interpersonal ties. For concerns. GilUgan (1982) has argued thatexample, from the moral point of view, there Kohlberg's (1969, 1971) formulation ofare problems with favoritism in the distribu- stages of moral development fails to ade-tion of goods, or with granting certain rights quately distinguish a morality of justice fromto and ensuring the welfare of only some a morality of care in interpersonal concernspeople (such as friends, family, or members and that, in Kohlberg's sequence, the latterof one's racial and ethnic group) and not oth- is relegated to lower stages. Gilligan and herers. At the same time, subordinating the in- colleagues (e.g., Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988)terests of close relations in favor of abstract propose that interpersonal concerns and jus-We thank Patricia Barasch, Jennifer Lewis, Kathleen McBrien, Toni Saunders, Loree Vail-lancour, and Jenny Yau for their assistance with the research. Reprint requests should be sentto Judith G. Smetana, Graduate School of Education and Human Development, University ofRochester, Rochester, NY 14627.