Abstract
Burgeoning evidence suggests that when children observe data, they use knowledge of the demonstrator's intent to augment learning. We propose that the effects of social learning may go beyond cases where children observe data, to cases where they receive no new information at all. We present a model of how simply asking a question a second time may lead to belief revision, when the questioner is expected to know the correct answer. We provide an analysis of the CHILDES corpus to show that these neutral follow‐up questions are used in parent–child conversations. We then present three experiments investigating 4‐ and 5‐year‐old children's reactions to neutral follow‐up questions posed by ignorant or knowledgeable questioners. Children were more likely to change their answers in response to a neutral follow‐up question from a knowledgeable questioner than an ignorant one. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of common practices in legal, educational, and experimental psychological settings.
Highlights
How do children form their beliefs about the world given that their experiences are so sparse, noisy, ambiguous, and often indirect? Considerable evidence suggests that children can learn from their own interventions (Bonawitz et al, 2012; Cook, Goodman, & Schulz, 2011; Schulz, Gopnik, & Glymour, 2007; Sodian et al, 1991), from patterns of covariation (Gweon & Schulz, 2011; Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007; Schulz, Bonawitz, & Griffiths, 2007; Schulz & Gopnik, 2004), and from testimony of others (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005)
This work demonstrates that by asking children the same question a second time, without providing additional evidence, children are very likely to switch their predictions. This tendency for children to switch responses after seemingly innocuous follow-up questions might be interpreted as an irrational behavior: Children may have limited memory for previous responses; they may fail to understand the question; or they may otherwise be behaving “noisily.” the tendency to switch responses following neutral questions might instead be indicative of a rational process: Children might be making inferences about the intentions of the questioner and using these social inferences to reinterpret the validity of their own beliefs
The hypothesis we present here suggests that children do not use social inferences to enhance learning from observed, physical data
Summary
How do children form their beliefs about the world given that their experiences are so sparse, noisy, ambiguous, and often indirect? Considerable evidence suggests that children can learn from their own interventions (Bonawitz et al, 2012; Cook, Goodman, & Schulz, 2011; Schulz, Gopnik, & Glymour, 2007; Sodian et al, 1991), from patterns of covariation (Gweon & Schulz, 2011; Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007; Schulz, Bonawitz, & Griffiths, 2007; Schulz & Gopnik, 2004), and from testimony of others (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005). This work demonstrates that by asking children the same question a second time, without providing additional evidence, children are very likely to switch their predictions This tendency for children to switch responses after seemingly innocuous follow-up questions might be interpreted as an irrational behavior: Children may have limited memory for previous responses; they may fail to understand the question; or they may otherwise be behaving “noisily.” the tendency to switch responses following neutral questions might instead be indicative of a rational process: Children might be making inferences about the intentions of the questioner and using these social inferences to reinterpret the validity of their own beliefs. Instead of serving as queries about children’s certainty, repeated questions serve as a kind of social evidence that triggers belief updating, we would have to reassess the use and validity of, as well as the answers obtained with, these techniques We explore this problem from computational, observational, and empirical approaches. Our approach lets us explore the hypothesis that children are making a social inference when responding to otherwise “neutral” questions
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