Chernev, Borislav Twilight of Empire: The Brest-Litovsk Conference and the Remaking of East-Central Europe, 1917–1918 (review)

Abstract

SEER, 96, 2, APRIL 2018 374 peace negotiations and the introduction of grain requisitioning in spring 1918, and the abortive Left SR uprising in July 1918 accelerated the drift towards civil war. Throughout all these developments, Lenin persistently invoked the concept of party discipline to assert his position. Ultimately, the author argues, it was this combination of discipline and ideology that led the masses ‘along an unnecessary path’ to ‘dictatorship and terror’ (p. 2). Swain makes the case for this interpretation of the revolution in a robust manner that clearly reflects his deep and detailed knowledge of the topic, and although not everyone will agree fully with his main arguments, this is a stimulating and concise introduction to some key themes. The focus is very much on the period from the February Revolution to the summer of 1918, and in this respect the book provides a more condensed chronological treatment of the revolution than has been typical in recent historiography. It can be contrasted with, for example, the growing body of scholarship that discusses 1917 as part of a broader context of uninterrupted crisis that stretched from 1914 to 1922. University of Dundee Murray Frame Chernev, Borislav. Twilight of Empire: The Brest-Litovsk Conference and the Remaking of East-Central Europe, 1917–1918. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, ON, Buffalo, NY and London, 2017. xx + 301 pp. Map. Illustrations. Glossary. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $75.00. The latest general study on this topic before Borislav Chernev’s book is John Wheeler-Bennett’s The Forgotten Peace: Brest-Litovsk, March 1918 (New York 1939). Chernev’s work is welcome as an updated general overview. It also brings new information based on archival sources. In his introduction, Chernev emphasizes how disagreements between German civilian and military authorities and between the four Central Powers prevented them from merely dictating their conditions on Soviet Russia. In chapter one, the author shows how the Bolshevik revolution and peace initiative put the process in motion, while the Central Powers reacted to the events. Chapter two examines the debates on national self-determination: it was Lenin who brought national self-determination into modern political vocabulary. The Central Powers went along with the Bolshevik formula of peace without annexations or indemnities on the basis of national self-determination. However, neither side was fully sincere: for the Bolsheviks, proletarian world revolution took precedence over national self-determination, while politicians of the Central Powers used national self-determination as an argument to gain new dependencies for themselves. REVIEWS 375 In chapter three, the author analyses the large strikes in Austria-Hungary in January 1918 with demands for food and peace. Although the Bolsheviks perceived the events as the beginning of revolution, the Austrian Social Democrats’ moderate leadership preferred not to begin one. Chapter four discusses the first Brest-Litovsk peace treaty which was concluded between Ukraine and the Central Powers. Chernev rejects the perception of Ukraine as the Central Powers’ puppet at this time. He agrees with Jerry Hoffman and Oleh S. Fedyshyn in that the Central Powers’ Ostpolitik was improvised and reactive. Based on Bulgarian documents, the author presents substantial new information on the Central Powers’ initial orientation in the Ukrainian question: Habsburg and German ministers of foreign affairs welcomed the independent Ukraine, while the German military authorities and the Ottoman delegate Talaat Pasha wanted to treat Ukraine as confederated with Russia. In chapter five, the author writes on Bulgaria’s failed aspirations to territorial expansion. Chapter six discusses the conclusion of the treaty between the Central Powers and Russia. In the final stage of negotiations, it was Soviet Russia which suffered from disagreements within its own ranks. In order to defeat the adherents of revolutionary war, Lenin allied with Trotskii whom he permitted to proceed with his policy of unilateral declaration of the end of hostilities without a formal peace treaty. This resulted in a new German attack and signing of a peace with even worse conditions for Soviet Russia. Chernev evaluates the treaties of Brest-Litovsk as better than their reputation. The terms were indeed harsh on Soviet Russia, but this resulted from the Bolsheviks’ own betting on the immediate world revolution. Soviet Russia ceded not much territory...